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INTRODUCTION

The United States has long been heralded a “melting pot,” a
blend of multiple cultures striving toward the same goal: the American Dream. America continually strives to be the land of the free, the
land of diversity, and the land of acceptance—except for those who
do not speak English. In the United States, language barriers have
become an increasing problem for non-English-speaking residents,
citizens and non-citizens alike. In the year 2000, nearly 18% of the
population ages five and over spoke a language other than English in
their homes, while 8.1% of the same population spoke English “less
1
than very well.” What that means for those 8.1% of people living in
the United States is that, day to day, they may face barriers to obtain2
ing the services they need to function in society, from going to the
grocery store to navigating public transportation, or even receiving
3
proper medical treatment.
Non-English-speaking individuals in the United States also face
tremendous burdens in obtaining assistance in the criminal justice
4
5
system. Many procedural safeguards protect “language minorities,”
∗

J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, The Pennsylvania
State University.
1
Hyon B. Shin, Language Use and English Speaking Ability: 2000, Census 2000
Brief (Oct. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf.
2
Id.
3
See Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal for
Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 543
(2004).
4
Id. (discussing the indistinguishable “babble of voices” that “language minorities” face in the legal process, from retaining legal advice they can understand to obtaining “meaningful courtroom justice”).
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such as the Federal Court Interpreters Act and accompanying state
6
These safeguards are critical in providing
interpreter statutes.
7
“meaningful courtroom justice” for language minorities, but often
they are not enough.
Within the criminal justice system, an indigent, non-Englishspeaking criminal defendant needs significant aid in the preparation
of a post-conviction proceeding. Every criminal defendant is entitled
to an attorney by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution both
8
for trial and for a direct appeal. Once a defendant has exhausted his
direct appeal, however, he no longer has the right to an attorney, and
if he does not have the means to employ one, he must attack his con9
viction pro se. Because there is no right to counsel in a postconviction proceeding, more than ninety percent of prisoners peti10
tioning for habeas corpus represent themselves.
The writ of habeas corpus is a criminal defendant’s last chance
11
to obtain relief in our criminal justice system. This opportunity is
equally important to both English-speaking and non-English-speaking
criminal defendants alike, as it is the only way for prisoners who have
exhausted all remedies in state court to appeal to a federal court for
12
13
relief from an unconstitutional incarceration. The “Great Writ,”
however, has been significantly narrowed by the Anti-Terrorism and
14
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which significantly
narrowed prisoners’ ability to obtain that relief by enacting a one-year
15
statute of limitations and by severely limiting any successive attempts
16
for habeas corpus relief, thus allowing most prisoners only one
chance to obtain relief.
5

Id.
See, e.g., Federal Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006).
7
Rearick, supra note 3, at 544.
8
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987) (holding that the right to
appointed counsel extends only to the first appeal of right).
9
See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177
(Mar. 9, 2006) (previously provided that any defendant facing the death penalty was
entitled to counsel in federal habeas proceedings).
10
Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal
Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1558 (1997).
11
Id. at 1514. “[T]he writ of habeas corpus is a crucial link in our governmental
structure, providing a necessary avenue of redress for individual rights when the
criminal justice system has foreclosed all other options.” Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
15
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006).
16
Id. § 2244(b); see infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
6
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This narrowing of habeas corpus relief created a strong barrier
17
for indigent criminal defendants wishing to bring their claims. Understanding the procedural and substantive law well enough to bring
one’s post-conviction claim within the one-year statute of limitations
18
is a daunting task for someone with no legal education. For someone who does not understand English, bringing a post-conviction
claim for relief is nearly impossible not simply because of his lack of
legal background, but also because his lack of English language understanding would prevent him from learning about any of the legal
19
background he would need to file a claim.
If a non-Englishspeaking criminal defendant is deprived of access to legal materials
or legal assistance in his own language he will be unable to understand not only how to apply for habeas relief but also how to comply
20
with the strict requirements of the AEDPA.
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Mendoza v. Ca21
rey. It was the first circuit court to hold that a criminal defendant
who does not speak or understand English might be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations if, while
incarcerated, he was denied legal materials or legal assistance in his
22
The court thus created a new “extraordinary cirown language.
23
cumstance” under which an other-language defendant might obtain
equitable tolling if he exerted reasonable diligence in attempting to
obtain the legal materials or assistance necessary for him to know of
24
the statute of limitations. This holding—that lack of library access
or legal assistance in another language should constitute a ground
for equitable tolling—seemingly conflicts with the recent holding of

17

Sessions, supra note 10, at 1568 (“The AEDPA . . . seriously impedes these unjustly incarcerated men and women from vindicating their federal rights in federal
courts.”).
18
Id. at 1567 (“Congress cannot reasonably expect petitioners to understand the
complexities of their own cases, as well as those of the habeas procedural system, by
the time the statute of limitations runs out.”); see also Thomas C. O’Bryant, Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After AEDPA: The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299,
306 (2006) (describing the difficulties of a pro se prisoner seeking relief prior to the
AEDPA).
19
See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
20
See id.
21
449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
22
Id. at 1069.
23
Id. at 1071.
24
Id. at 1069–70.
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the Supreme Court in Kane v. Espitia that a pro se defendant has no
26
positive Sixth Amendment right to law library access.
Despite the holding in Kane, a non-English-speaking criminal defendant should be entitled to law library access or legal assistance in
his own language, based on the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in
27
Lewis v. Casey. While Lewis does not spell out a positive right to access for other-language criminal defendants, it does require that
28
every prisoner have the capability to bring his claim to court. Because an other-language defendant is barred from bringing his claim
29
by the “extraordinary circumstance” of denial of access to materials
or assistance in his own language, he is arguably being denied the
30
constitutional right under Lewis to have his claim heard. A possible
constitutional deprivation undoubtedly satisfies the requisite extraordinary circumstance required for equitable tolling; thus, if an otherlanguage prisoner asserts due diligence in attempting to obtain that
material or assistance, he should be entitled to equitable tolling of
31
the AEDPA. Equity also calls for this same result; it is unjust that
someone who speaks another language and who has no knowledge of
the AEDPA should be denied his claim simply because he was deprived of access to materials or assistance in his own language.
To address the significance of the holding of Mendoza v. Carey in
light of recent changes to habeas corpus law, Part II of this Comment
analyzes the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the significant narrowing of
its relief by the AEDPA. Part III then analyzes the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on law library access in general. Part IV addresses
Mendoza v. Carey’s holding in light of seemingly conflicting Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and why other jurisdictions, as well as the Supreme Court, should allow for equitable tolling of the AEDPA for
non-English-speaking criminal defendants who have been denied access to legal materials or legal assistance in their own languages. Finally, Part V discusses the policy reasons supporting equitable tolling
in this circumstance.

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

546 U.S. 9 (2005).
Id.
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 355.
See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
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II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE
GREAT WRIT AND THE AEDPA
The Great Writ is derived from common law in thirteenth32
century England, but it was ingrained in U.S. history when it was
33
made immortal in the Constitution. In 1867, the federal writ of habeas corpus was extended to state prisoners as well, making federal
relief available for anyone incarcerated in a state prison against fed34
eral law. The Supreme Court expanded the writ in its decisions,
making it “a mighty river that served as a powerful force in the pres35
ervation of personal liberties.” The purpose of habeas corpus relief,
and the reason for its perpetual existence in our legal system, is to allow prisoners to present claims of constitutional violations that occurred during trial and that therefore make the incarceration uncon36
stitutional.
After 1976, in a number of decisions, the Supreme Court began
37
to curb the availability of federal habeas relief, both by limiting the
writ procedurally and by limiting the number of successive claims a
38
petitioner might bring. Despite this judicial restriction of the writ,
however, there was never a statute of limitations during which a prisoner had to bring his claim for relief, nor was there a statutory restriction on successive attempts at habeas relief—that is, until the
39
AEDPA was enacted in 1996.
The AEDPA, the first law enacted to create a statute of limitations for bringing a petition for habeas corpus relief, was enacted on
40
April 24, 1996, in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing perpe32

James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in
Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 415 (2001).
33
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of the Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”).
34
Max Rosenn, State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures: The Great
Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 341 (1983).
35
Id. at 353.
36
Karen M. Marshall, Note, Finding Time for Federal Habeas Corpus: Carey v. Saffold, 37 AKRON L. REV. 549, 554 (2004).
37
See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding that a prisoner could
bring claims only after “total exhaustion” of all state claims); see also Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982) (holding that a prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to
federal court without first bringing it to an unsympathetic state court must demonstrate “cause and actual prejudice” in order to have his claim heard).
38
See Rosenn, supra note 34, at 355–63 (describing “the Ebb Tide” of habeas jurisprudence created by the Supreme Court’s significant curbing of the right to relief
under habeas corpus).
39
Liebman, supra note 32, at 416.
40
Sessions, supra note 10, at 1514.
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41

trated by Timothy McVeigh. The AEDPA was promoted as a means
of making sure that McVeigh would receive swift and “effective” pun42
ishment for the tragedy he caused. Despite McVeigh’s status as a
federal prisoner, ironically the AEDPA severely limits habeas corpus
review for state prisoners, and the one-year statute of limitations had
43
no effect on McVeigh’s situation. Congress’s purported goal, other
than assuring the public that McVeigh would be executed, was “to reduce the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed and repeti44
tive findings.” Its effect, however, is to procedurally deprive many
criminal defendants of the ability to attack their state sentences on
45
federal constitutional grounds.
While theoretically one year should be ample time in which a
criminal defendant may prepare his claim to present to the court,
upon closer analysis the AEDPA presents a harsh barrier to compli46
ance for criminal defendants. The one-year statute of limitations
begins to run when the prisoner has exhausted all of his remedies at
47
the state level, which means that it begins to run as soon as a direct
48
appeal of his sentence is no longer possible. To attempt to allow
time for state remedy of the constitutional violation, the AEDPA provides for statutory tolling when the prisoner has “properly filed” an
49
application for state post-conviction relief. Until the prisoner does
50
so, however, the time begins to run. After the prisoner has “properly filed” his application for state post-conviction relief, the AEDPA’s
51
statute of limitations tolls until a decision is rendered. If the state
denies the prisoner relief, the time begins to run again, and the prisoner is then left with only the time that remained prior to filing his

41

Liebman, supra note 32, at 413 (“AEDPA . . . was the product of the bizarre
alignment of three ill-starred events: Timothy McVeigh’s twisted patriotism and disdain for ‘collateral damage,’ the Gingrich Revolution in its heyday, and the Clinton
Presidency at the furthest point of its most rightward triangulation.”).
42
Id. at 412.
43
Id. at 414.
44
H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
45
Liebman, supra note 32, at 414 (“AEDPA’s many complications and interpretive conundrums . . . are a nightmarish obstacle course for unrepresented . . . noncapital petitioners.”).
46
O’Bryant, supra note 18, at 307.
47
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).
48
Id.
49
Id. § 2244(d)(2).
50
Liebman, supra note 32, at 417.
51
Id.
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application—meaning 365 days minus the time he took before he
52
“properly filed” his state post-conviction application.
An application is “properly filed” within the meaning of the statute only “when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the
53
applicable laws and rules governing filings.”
The “properly filed”
requirement severely challenges criminal defendants in that, if their
post-conviction appeal has not been properly filed in state court, the
54
clock continues to tick. Even if a defendant believes that he has
filed a timely state post-conviction appeal, and has taken all necessary
55
steps to do so, the AEDPA time may still be running. By the time he
has discovered that his post-conviction appeal has been improperly
filed, he may have lost any right to bring his claim, or may not have a
56
reasonable amount of time in which to apply for habeas relief.
The AEDPA also allows most prisoners only one opportunity for
57
habeas relief.
In most instances, prisoners have one year in which
to bring their claims, and if they fail in court, or if they miss the oneyear deadline, they are not entitled to relief despite the fact that they
58
may have suffered legitimate constitutional wrongs. The statute directs federal courts to dismiss any “second or successive habeas cor59
pus application . . . that was presented in a prior application.” If the
prisoner wishes to bring a new claim that has not previously been
presented, the statute directs courts to dismiss the claim unless either
(1) the Supreme Court provides a new constitutional right that is
made retroactive or (2) underlying facts of the new claim, which must
be able to prove the defendant innocent of the underlying offense by
clear and convincing evidence, could not have been discovered in
60
that year with due diligence. These strict limitations provide most
defendants with just one chance to obtain relief and just one year in
which they may file for it.
Because of these harsh and final consequences and because of
the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to our criminal justice
system, a majority of the circuits have allowed for equitable tolling of
the AEDPA in “extraordinary circumstances” where the defendant

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
O’Bryant, supra note 18, at 305–06.
Id.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006).
Id. § 2244(d).
Id. § 2244(b)(1).
Id. § 2244(b)(2).
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61

has been diligently pursuing his claim.
The Supreme Court has
never addressed whether equitable tolling applies in the context of
62
the AEDPA, but in Pace v. DiGuglielmo the Court assumed arguendo
that equitable tolling did apply in order to deny the petitioner his re63
lief. The Court articulated that “[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraor64
dinary circumstance stood in his way.” Despite the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to acknowledge a right to equitable tolling under the
65
AEDPA, most circuits have allowed for equitable tolling using the
66
“extraordinary circumstances” test the Court acknowledged in Pace.
Extraordinary circumstances for the purpose of equitable tolling
is a very strict standard that should be applied only when “the principles of equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period
67
unfair.”
Examples of extraordinary circumstances in an AEDPA
statute of limitations case include an attorney’s misrepresentation to
68
his client that he had timely filed a complaint, prison officials’ intentional tampering with a pro se petitioner’s habeas petition and le69
gal papers which prevented the prisoner from filing on time, and a
prisoner’s failure to receive notice of denial of his state review for
70
nearly four months.
71
Until Mendoza v. Carey, the presence of a language barrier had
not been identified as an “extraordinary circumstance” that would
qualify a petitioner for equitable tolling, no matter how diligently a
72
73
petitioner has been seeking his claim. In Cobas v. Burgess, the Sixth
61

See, e.g., Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998); see
also Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216
F.3d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329–30 (4th Cir.
2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Marr, 141
F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 210 (1998); Calderon v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998).
62
544 U.S. 408 (2005).
63
Id. at 418 n.8.
64
Id. at 418.
65
See, e.g., LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2005); Davis v. Johnson,
158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998).
66
544 U.S. at 418.
67
LaCava, 398 F.3d at 275–76 (quoting Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145
F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998)).
68
Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 1999).
69
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2000).
70
Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F. 3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).
71
449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
72
See Perez v. Sherrer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16575, *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2006)
(“[O]ne's coming from a foreign or ethnic backgrounds [sic] where English is not

GRANDINETTI (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:41:55 PM

COMMENT

1487

Circuit was the first to address the issue and held that “[a]n inability
to speak, write and/or understand English, in and of itself, does not
automatically give a petitioner reasonable cause for failing to know
74
In that case,
about the legal requirements for filing his claims.”
however, it was questionable whether the petitioner had problems
with the English language, and he had also received assistance from
75
other prisoners in preparing his claim. The court, therefore, was
not presented with a situation where a language barrier had prevented a prisoner from complying with the AEDPA.
76
In United States v. Montano, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue briefly in a footnote and agreed with Cobas that the defendant’s
“language difficulties” could not qualify as an extraordinary circum77
stance for the purposes of equitable tolling. The petitioner in that
case, however, was represented by an attorney and had claimed that
his problems with the English language prevented him from discover78
79
ing the challenge on his own. Similarly, in United States v. Cordova,
the Tenth Circuit held that “[l]ack of familiarity with the English language does not rise to the level of a rare or exceptional circumstance
which would warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations pe80
riod.” In that case, the petitioner attempted to argue that he should
be granted equitable tolling because it took him over two years to become familiar enough with the English language to file a claim for
81
habeas relief.
Mendoza is easily distinguishable from all three of these opposing
cases. Unlike the petitioner in Cobas, the petitioner in Mendoza was
unable, despite his efforts, to receive assistance from other inmates in
82
preparing his claim until after the AEDPA deadline had passed.

the primary language cannot qualify as ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ A substantial
part of inmate population does come from such backgrounds, but this limitation
does not give rise to equitable tolling.”); see also Perez v. Johnson, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23727, *12 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2001), aff’d, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23725
(N.D. Tex. July 6, 2001) (“Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the English language
does not rise to the level of a rare or exceptional circumstance which would warrant
equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitation period.”).
73
306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002).
74
Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
75
Id.
76
398 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005).
77
Id. at 1280 n.5.
78
Id.
79
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32289 (10th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999).
80
Id. at *4.
81
Id. at *4–5.
82
Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Unlike the petitioner in Montano, the petitioner in Mendoza did not
83
have access to an attorney to prepare his petition. In addition, the
petitioner in Mendoza was not arguing for more time to grasp the
English language—an entirely abstract concept, as was argued in Cordova—but rather, that the prison should afford him the opportunity
to pursue his legal claim with materials or assistance in his own lan84
guage.
While the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are currently in
opposition to Mendoza’s premise—that an other-language defendant
might be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA—their cases all
lack one important aspect: the law library or legal assistance that was
85
requested by petitioner in Mendoza. While all three circuits agree,
and Mendoza also reinforces the notion, that language barriers alone
are not an extraordinary circumstance, none of the courts addresses
whether access to legal materials in one’s own language is necessary
to comply with the AEDPA, whether it is out of the petitioners’ control, and whether it is so extraordinary as to preclude their seeking of
habeas relief.
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING
LAW LIBRARY ACCESS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
A positive right to law library access for criminal defendants did
86
not exist until the Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v. Smith. The
Court examined whether the right of access to courts required prisoners to have law library access in order for them to bring legal
87
claims. Ultimately, the Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
88
from persons trained in the law.” The Court also announced that
“habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme,’” thus highlighting the impor89
tance of habeas review in “protect[ing] our most valued rights.” As

83

Id. at 1067–68. Mendoza ultimately was only able to file both for his state relief
and for his federal habeas relief with the aid of Spanish-speaking inmates who prepared the claims for him. Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1068; see supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text.
86
430 U.S. 817 (1977).
87
Id. at 817.
88
Id. at 828.
89
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)).
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a basis for its decision, the Court used its prior case law on access to
90
91
courts, based on Equal Protection and Due Process rights.
The right created in Bounds was one for “meaningful” access to
the courts for indigent prisoners, but the decision did not make clear
92
how the states were supposed to provide it. The Court suggested
the establishment of “adequate law libraries” but made clear that “alternative means,” such as assistance from those trained in the law,
were not only acceptable but also encouraged to help indigent pris93
oners achieve access.
This right was relied on for nearly twenty years until the Supreme Court again reviewed the concept of law library access for
94
prisoners in Lewis v. Casey and significantly narrowed its Bounds
holding. In Lewis, based largely on standing issues, the Court announced that Bounds did not establish an affirmative right to a law library or legal assistance: “[t]he right that Bounds acknowledged was
95
the (already well-established) right of access to the courts.” The Court
refuted any notion that Bounds created “an abstract, freestanding
96
right to a law library or legal assistance,” and recast the right merely
97
as a right to bring the grievance the prisoner wishes to present. In
98
reframing this issue as the “right of access to the courts,” the Court
briefly touched on non-English-speaking and illiterate criminal defendants, and stated that prison officials need to provide them only
with the capability to bring their claims while announcing an extremely deferential standard: “we leave it to prison officials to determine how best to ensure that inmates with language problems have a
90

Id. at 828–30.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
the right articulated in Bounds has been described as a “consequence of due process,
as an aspect of equal protection, or as an equal protection guarantee”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
92
John Matosky, Note, Illiterate Inmates and the Right of Meaningful Access to the
Courts, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 295, 297 (1998).
93
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830–31.
94
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
95
Id. at 350.
96
Id. at 351.
97
Id. at 354–55. In reframing the issue, the Court noted that:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to
be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.
Id. at 355.
98
Id. at 350.
91
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reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims chal99
lenging their convictions or conditions of confinement.”
The Court dismissed many of the claims, finding that the claims
failed to allege “actual injury—that is, actual prejudice with respect to
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a fil100
ing deadline or to present a claim.”
Where injury was shown on
behalf of both the illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners, it
was not “systemwide,” and, therefore, the injunctive relief requested—a more effective law library system or assistance—was un101
reasonable and unnecessary.
In addition, the Court required that any measure a state adopts
102
to grant relief must comply with the reasonableness standard as set
103
In examining prisoners’ rights to marry
forth in Turner v. Safley.
and to communicate with inmates in other prisons, Turner held that
prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights “is valid
104
The
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Court must look to the impact of how accommodating a prisoner’s
constitutional right will burden the prison guards, the other inmates,
105
Only if an inmate can point to an aland the prison’s resources.
ternative solution that will further the right at “de minimis cost to valid
penological interests” will the court find a violation of the reason106
ableness standard.
The final case that is necessary to understand Supreme Court ju107
risprudence on law library access is Kane v. Espitia, in which the
Court held that there is no positive Sixth Amendment right to law li108
brary access for a pro se criminal defendant. The defendant in that
case was seeking habeas corpus relief, which requires that the relief
denied be “contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
109
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment
of the United States.”
110
right to counsel, which, under Faretta v. California, provides for the
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 361.
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
546 U.S. 9 (2005).
Id. at 10.
Id. (citations omitted).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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right to represent oneself, does not provide a positive right to access a
111
112
law library. The Kane defendant relied solely upon Faretta, which
113
Because the defendant
in no way alludes to law library access.
never raised the issue before the Court, the decision is silent on the
“right of access to courts” standard as established by the interplay be114
tween Bounds and Lewis.
The result of this jigsaw puzzle of Supreme Court jurisprudence
is that there is no absolute right to law library access, as it was origi115
nally construed from Bounds.
Lewis significantly narrowed Bounds
by disclaiming its earlier holding regarding the right of law library ac116
cess, and Kane essentially ruled out a positive right to that access
117
based on the Sixth Amendment.
Although there is no positive
right to law library access under Supreme Court jurisprudence, prisoners must still be capable of bringing their claims before the courts
118
119
based on Lewis, subject to the reasonableness standard of Turner.
IV. MENDOZA AND LEWIS:
DENIAL OF THE CAPABILITY TO BRING ONE’S CLAIM
SHOULD QUALIFY AS AN “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE”
120

In Mendoza v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit held that the “combination of 1) a prison law library’s lack of Spanish-language legal materials, and 2) a petitioner’s inability to obtain translation assistance before the one-year deadline, could constitute extraordinary
121
circumstances.”
In this prisoner’s case, there were “no Spanish
books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no postings about
122
the AEDPA time limitations in any language.”
The court declared
that the denial of those materials, along with the lack of any “other
source” of translation, could constitute an extraordinary circum123
The court then remanded the case for a factual finding as
stance.
to whether the prisoner had exhausted all remedies available to him
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Kane, 546 U.S. at 10.
Id.
Faretta, 422 U.S. 806.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350.
Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005).
518 U.S. at 350.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1070.
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124

in attempting to gather the other-language materials or assistance.
The Mendoza court applied the same rationale it had used in Wha125
lem/Hunt v. Early, where an English-speaking prisoner who had no
access to any material, even a poster announcing the AEDPA one-year
statute of limitations, could be granted equitable tolling if, in fact, he
126
had asserted due diligence in pursuing his claim.
The petitioner in Mendoza argued that during his first three
months of incarceration he had requested materials but had been
told that he would not be able to access any Spanish materials until
127
The petitioner also claimed
he was transported to another prison.
that he visited the library at his second prison several times only to
discover that there were no books, materials, or forms available in
128
Spanish, nor were there Spanish-speaking clerks or librarians.
Based on this lack of access and assistance in his language, he
claimed that he had no way to know that he needed to comply with
129
According to the petitioner, he
the one-year statute of limitations.
was finally able to prepare any applications for post-conviction relief
130
only by approaching inmates for assistance. Because the trial court
dismissed the petition as untimely without an evidentiary hearing, the
131
However, the Menprisoner’s allegations could not be established.
doza court recognized that if the facts he alleged were true, this might
132
qualify as the requisite due diligence necessary for equitable tolling.
The Mendoza court immediately dismissed the notion that its decision might appear to conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Kane that there is no positive Sixth Amendment right to law library
133
access.
Careful not to contradict that decision, the Mendoza court
134
As long
refused to announce a positive right to law library access.
as the prisoner is able to obtain access to materials or assistance in his

124

Id. at 1071.
233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000).
126
Id. at 1147–48.
127
449 F.3d at 1067.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1068.
130
Id. at 1067.
131
Id. at 1071.
132
Id. (“[H]e has alleged facts that, if true, may entitle him to equitable tolling.”).
133
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070 (“Our conclusion is completely consistent with the
Supreme Court’s recent decision addressing law library access rights.”).
134
Id. at 1070 n.5 (“[W]e announce no rule affirmatively requiring that prisons
provide legal materials in Spanish.”).
125
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own language, including translation assistance from another pris135
oner, equitable tolling will not be available.
The Mendoza court recognized and agreed with the Sixth Circuit
136
decision in Cobas v. Burgess that the inability to understand English
137
The court also
does not automatically justify equitable tolling.
agreed that the presence of a fellow inmate who can translate, read,
and write English, and who assists petitioner in preparing his habeas
138
petition, renders equitable tolling inapplicable.
Although careful to avoid conflict with Kane, the Mendoza court
failed to delve deeper into Supreme Court jurisprudence to provide a
substantive justification for the equitable tolling. As discussed above,
Lewis provides that there is a right of access to courts and that prison139
By deers must be provided the opportunity to bring their claims.
nying non-English-speaking prisoners access to other-language legal
materials, legal assistance, or translation, the prison authorities essentially deprive prisoners of their ability to bring their claims in a timely
manner, which, because of the strict ramifications of the AEDPA,
prevents them from bringing their claims at all.
This appears to be a Lewis violation and therefore could arguably
140
offend the constitutional right of access to courts.
If this violation
is serious enough to amount to a constitutional violation, then it logically follows that this violation should automatically trigger equitable
tolling because a constitutional violation is something out of the con141
trol of the prisoner that hindered his ability to obtain relief. In order to prove a constitutional violation of the right of access to courts
135

Id. at 1070.
306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002).
137
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070.
138
Id. at 1069–70.
139
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
140
Id. at 356. The Court specifically addressed the scenario where an otherlanguage defendant is unable to bring his claim:
When any inmate, even an illiterate or non-English-speaking inmate,
shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired to bring
has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is
currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not
been provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish
“adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law.”
Id. (citations omitted).
141
LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 217, 276 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Hubler v. Oritz, 190
Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the AEDPA limitations period is
“subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances, such as where ‘a constitutional violation [will] result[] in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or
incompetent’”) (citations omitted).
136
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set forth by Lewis, a prisoner would have to show that he had been actually injured by the prison’s actions or regulation—in other words,
that he was prevented by the prison officials from bringing his claim
142
before the court. A petitioner who does not speak any English and
is deprived of law library materials or legal assistance in his own language within the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations, despite his
efforts to obtain them, is undoubtedly being denied access to courts.
He would also have to prove that any remedy that might be instituted
143
would pass the reasonableness test of Turner.
Based on Lewis’s deference to prison officials and its require144
ment of compliance with the reasonableness standard in Turner, a
prisoner who has been denied access to legal materials or assistance
145
in his own language would be able to prove injury.
It is questionable, however, whether he might prove the widespread actual injury
that would be required for the court to remedy the situation systemwide by providing equal access to materials for all prisoners, no mat146
The government could argue that
ter what language they speak.
providing law library access or translation services for each otherlanguage prisoner, no matter what language he speaks, would be extremely cost-prohibitive. The prison officials would not be required
to take on such a cumbersome task based on Lewis’s deference to
147
Turner.
As long as the prison officials could argue that the impact
on the prisons is too great to accommodate the right, prisoners would
148
have a difficult time finding a “de minimis cost” solution to the language barrier issue.
A petitioner could argue, however, for cost-effective remedies
that a court might consider. For example, the prison libraries could
provide limited Internet access to each prisoner and direct each to a
webpage in his native language that would inform him of the statute
149
of limitations.
The prisons could also present each prisoner with a
pamphlet explaining his rights under the AEDPA in his own lan142

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 361.
144
Id. (“[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights ‘is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”).
145
Id. at 356.
146
Id. at 359 (noting that two instances of injury were a “patently inadequate basis
for a conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide relief”).
147
Id.
148
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
149
Titia A. Holtz, Note, Reaching Out from Behind Bars: The Constitutionality of Laws
Barring Prisoners from the Internet, 67 BROOK L. REV. 855, 864 (2002) (discussing an Internet-based education system implemented in Maryland through which students can
earn a college degree while incarcerated).
143
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guage. Furthermore, the prison could implement a “languagebuddy” system, in which the prison could match each prisoner with a
fellow inmate who would be available to translate from that prisoner’s
language to English and help him prepare any claim he might
150
Based on these alternative remedies, if widespread actual inhave.
jury exists, a court might provide the injunctive relief needed to remedy the prisons’ denial of access to other-language prisoners.
It is quite speculative, however, whether a court would indeed
find for prisoners in this instance. The Supreme Court announced
that deference to prison officials would be a difficult obstacle for
prisoners to overcome, despite creative remedies prisons could pro151
vide at a “de minimis cost.” In addition, the widespread actual injury
requirement necessary to implement these changes implemented
would indeed be difficult to face; not all other-language criminal defendants speak the same language, and establishing a system to provide translation assistance or materials for each language would be
burdensome. A court would likely defer to the prison officials’ judgment because accommodating every other-language prisoner’s needs
would be a tremendous financial and administrative burden on the
prison system.
If a prisoner could not establish this widespread actual injury requirement and could only establish that he had been individually injured by the prison’s denial of his access, then he might have a slight
chance at obtaining some relief under Lewis, but that, too, is questionable. A prisoner attempting to argue for relief under the accessto-courts theory would be at a loss, especially if he were arguing pro
se, because Lewis does not provide a clearly defined right. The Supreme Court summarily disposed of a pro se petitioner’s argument
that he had been denied law library access simply because he had ar152
gued it on the wrong constitutional theory. Based on the Court’s
treatment of the petitioner in Kane, even if a prisoner could argue for
the access required under Lewis, it is unlikely that he would be suc153
cessful in overcoming the Turner reasonableness standard. Where a
prisoner has been denied access to materials in his own language and
has therefore been deprived of the chance to bring his claim within
the necessary one-year AEDPA statute of limitations, there may be a
150

This could present some difficulties, however, due to the often adversarial nature of the prisoner-to-prisoner relationship.
151
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
152
Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005); see also supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
153
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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constitutional violation under Lewis. The question remains whether a
prisoner would be successful in presenting it to the court.
The lesser standard for extraordinary circumstances, however,
only requires that the petitioner show that for some reason beyond
154
his control he was unable to file his claim by the one-year deadline.
In denying prisoners access to AEDPA materials or assistance in their
own language, prison officials are denying other-language prisoners
the capability to bring their grievances to court. While this might
serve as a constitutional argument under Lewis, the denial of that access could more easily satisfy the lesser standard of an extraordinary
circumstance that would entitle a defendant to equitable tolling. A
prisoner who is unaware of a statute of limitations because he was refused help in a language he can understand cannot know that he has
missed the one-year deadline and his only chance to bring his
155
claim.
Equally important to the extraordinary circumstances analysis is
whether, in fact, the prisoner has exercised reasonable diligence in
156
pursuing his claim.
What this means for an other-language defendant is unclear because the Mendoza court was the first to recognize
that denial of access to an other-language defendant might be con157
Nevertheless, the Mendoza
sidered an extraordinary circumstance.
court determined that the petitioner in that case, if the facts he alleged were true, might well have satisfied the due diligence stan158
dard. The petitioner had inquired at both prisons’ libraries, within
159
He had also
the first few months, about other-language materials.
enlisted the assistance of two inmates in preparing both his state
160
claim, which was denied as untimely, and his habeas petition.
An other-language prisoner asserting due diligence might therefore have to prove, first, that there were no materials or assistance in
his language available to alert him of the AEDPA. He would also
have to establish that he inquired of the prison officials and the
154

Aaron G. McCollough, For Whom the Court Tolls: Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA
Statute of Limitations in Capital Habeas Cases, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 385 (2005).
Equitable tolling has been granted in situations such as where prison officials failed
to mail a defendant’s petition, where the defendant was able to prove “actual innocence,” or where the defendant was mentally incompetent at the time of trial. Id. at
384.
155
Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
156
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
157
See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.
158
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071.
159
Id. at 1067.
160
Id. at 1067–68.

GRANDINETTI (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:41:55 PM

COMMENT

1497

prison libraries whether other-language materials were available, at
least within the first few months, to establish that he had not been sitting on his claim. It is questionable whether he might have to file a
formal complaint with the prison to satisfy the requirement of admin161
istrative exhaustion, as his attempt to do so in a language he did
not understand would likely be futile and thus exempt from exhaus162
tion requirements. He might also have to prove that he was unable
to receive assistance from other inmates, either because he was unable to become familiar with inmates who spoke his own language
and were able to read, write, and speak English (whether due to social or administrative separation), or because there were no inmates
present at the facility who could meet those standards. Once the petitioner establishes this requisite due diligence, and he has already
proven that his inability to obtain translation assistance or materials
in his own language was out of his control, he may be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA based on the extraordinary circum163
stances test.
For the analysis of the extraordinary circumstances standard to
164
come full circle, it is important also to distinguish Kane.
The Mendoza court quickly dismissed any appearance of a facial conflict with
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Kane that there is no freestanding Sixth Amendment right of a pro se defendant to access a law
165
library. The Kane Court, however, determined whether there was a
“clearly established” federal right that had been violated for purposes
166
of habeas relief.
While Lewis’s right of access to courts might provide viable grounds for relief for a prisoner who has been denied law
library access or legal assistance that has thus prevented him from
167
bringing a claim, Kane is silent on this issue for the simple reason
168
Regardless of whether
that it was never raised by the petitioner.
denial of law library access or other assistance in one’s own language
161

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
162
Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (noting
that the doctrine of exhaustion contains an exception which permits early review
when exhaustion would prove “futile”).
163
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071.
164
Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005).
165
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070.
166
Kane, 546 U.S. at 9.
167
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
168
Id.
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would create a ground for habeas relief, the standard for equitable
tolling—“the presence of an extraordinary circumstance and the in169
mate’s exercise of diligence” —is significantly different from the
170
“clearly established” federal right that is required for habeas relief.
A prisoner need not allege a constitutional violation in order to gain
equitable tolling; he needs merely to assert some circumstance that
was beyond his control that prevented him, despite his diligence,
171
from pursuing his claim.
Because of this difference in legal standards, the fact that Kane
specifically denies a positive Sixth Amendment right to law library ac172
cess is non-dispositive.
A grant of more time in which a prisoner
might file a habeas petition based on his law library access would not
undermine Kane’s holding. Furthermore, it would reaffirm Lewis’s
173
notion that every petitioner must be able to bring his claim. Based
on the gravity of the violation—that there could be a constitutional
violation of the right of access to courts under Lewis—the situation
174
should qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance.”
While Lewis does not establish a positive right to law library access, and Kane refuses to announce one for a pro se defendant, a defendant nonetheless must be provided the capability to bring his
175
claim. Denial of access to law library materials or legal assistance in
a prisoner’s own language within the one-year period effectively prevents him from bringing his claim for wrongful imprisonment before
a federal court. This inability to bring a claim, despite his efforts,
should qualify for equitable relief under the AEDPA, even if a court
were reluctant to find a Lewis violation of access to courts.
This grant of equitable tolling would not place an additional
burden on the prison system and would thus comply with Turner’s
standard. In the case of a habeas petitioner who requests equitable
176
tolling, it is because his habeas petition has been summarily denied.
This means that the prisoner has already obtained assistance or materials and has attempted to prepare his claim, but the court has denied
177
His claim is arguably ripe, and once
him the chance to be heard.
169

Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071 n.6.
Kane, 546 U.S. at 9.
171
McCollough, supra note 154, at 385.
172
Kane, 546 U.S. at 9.
173
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
174
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071.
175
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350.
176
Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1068 (“[T]he magistrate judge recommended that Mendoza’s habeas petition be dismissed as untimely.”).
177
Id.
170
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granted the equitable tolling he may bring the claim before the court
for his chance at habeas relief. The equitable tolling, therefore,
would not place an additional burden on the prison system in which
the petitioner is incarcerated.
The intent of the AEDPA was to prevent abuse of habeas corpus
178
filings. A prisoner who has had no chance to bring a claim because
he was unable to learn of the statute of limitations cannot be accused
of abusing habeas corpus proceedings if he pursued his rights diligently. Any delay would be out of his control, and once he is ready to
present his claim he should not be punished for a failure on the part
of the prison system to provide him the capability to bring his claim.
While there would be a slight burden on the court to determine factually whether the petitioner was pursuing his rights, this is not because the petitioner has committed any wrongdoing. When the petitioner is able to bring his claim before the court after the provision of
equitable tolling, the court will provide the function it would have
had the claimant been capable of bringing his claim within the oneyear AEDPA deadline: access to justice for the petitioner.
V. THE ROLE OF THE GREAT WRIT
CALLS FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING
In addition to a possible violation of Lewis’s right of access to the
courts as an extraordinary circumstance requiring equitable tolling of
the AEDPA, the harshness of the AEDPA and the importance of the
Great Writ to our criminal justice system call for this relief. Even if
the cost-prohibitive nature of providing access to law library materials
or legal assistance to other-language criminal defendants in their own
languages were to undermine the argument based on Lewis’s right of
access to courts, several policy reasons surrounding the writ of habeas
corpus and the severe sanctions of violating the AEDPA call for equitable tolling: the Great Writ’s role as a remedy of last resort for pris179
oners who have been unconstitutionally incarcerated, the harsh
180
and unforgiving nature of the AEDPA, and the inherent inability to
provide equal access to justice for prisoners who do not understand
181
English.
Because the Great Writ originated as, and continues to be, the
last resort for prisoners to obtain relief in our criminal justice sys-

178
179
180
181

H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
Sessions, supra note 10, at 1515.
See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text.
Rearick, supra note 3, at 543.
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182

tem, providing the chance to bring a petition for habeas corpus to
each and every defendant is necessary to maintain our ideals of justice. If a prisoner is being incarcerated because of a constitutional
violation that occurred during his trial, he has a right to be heard, regardless of what language he speaks. The AEDPA significantly curbs
that right.
Imagine a prisoner without a high school education attempting
to discern when the one-year statute of limitations is triggered, and
when it is tolled, and whether his state application for post-conviction
183
Now imagine that same person
relief has been “properly filed.”
does not speak, read, write, or understand a word of English. That
person may not know that his constitutional rights were violated in a
lower court. But assuming that he does, and assuming that he knows
he is entitled to some sort of remedy, how is he supposed to obtain
that remedy if the prison does not furnish him with any materials or
assistance in a language that he can understand? If this person none184
theless attempts “diligently” to obtain materials or assistance from
the prison to no avail, is it fair to fault him procedurally for something that was completely out of his control? After the one-year period has passed, and he is finally able to file his claim, possibly with
help from another inmate or from family or friends on the outside, is
it fair to tell him that he missed the deadline and that he will remain
incarcerated, regardless of the constitutional violation, for the rest of
his sentence?
The AEDPA is harsh. The AEDPA is complicated. Although
common sense would dictate that the hypothetical, non-Englishspeaking prisoner receive a chance at habeas relief after he has
jumped numerous hurdles to even file the petition, in reality, denying him his last chance to challenge his imprisonment is inequitable.
As noted above, other courts have refused to hold that a language
barrier is enough to constitute an extraordinary circumstance to toll
185
the AEDPA statute of limitations.
Mendoza is the first court to recognize that a language barrier, combined with the inability to procure other-language materials or assistance, could be construed as an
extraordinary circumstance, and, if the petitioner exhibits the requi182

Sessions, supra note 10, at 1515. See also Benjamin R. Orye, Note, The Failure of
Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a
Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 441, 484 (Oct. 2002) (“The writ of habeas corpus, the Great Writ, is the
last resort of those who have been wrongly imprisoned.”).
183
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006).
184
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
185
See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.
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site diligence, he may be entitled to equitable relief.
The underlying purpose of the AEDPA was to prevent abuse of the habeas corpus
187
It was not intended to
system and to promote judicial efficiency.
categorically deprive non-English-speaking criminal defendants of
the right to bring a habeas petition. But that has been the effect for
many prisoners.
The purpose of the Great Writ is to free those wrongly impris188
oned. That venerable purpose is undermined not only by the
harsh, complicated, and unforgiving provisions of the AEDPA but
also by courts’ reluctance to recognize a language barrier as an extraordinary circumstance when a defendant cannot obtain the materials or assistance he needs to file a petition to challenge his wrongful
189
imprisonment.
By affording other-language criminal defendants
the opportunity to be heard in court, assuming they have diligently
pursued their claims, equitable tolling of the AEDPA in this circumstance brings the Great Writ back to its purpose of ensuring access to
justice.
While it is not guaranteed that other-language prisoners will be
able to prevail on their habeas corpus claims, it is necessary that they
at least have the chance to present their grievances to the court.
Once in court, the petitioner is afforded two protections: a court
190
translator through which he may present the facts of his case and
the court’s application of “less stringent standards” by which it ana191
lyzes petitioner’s claim when he appears pro se.
A prisoner who
has been afforded equitable tolling of his habeas petition based upon
his inability to access other language materials, but who has been able
through some other means to file his habeas petition, will be on nearequal footing with any other English-speaking petitioner. It is a small
step to afford this class of prisoners equitable tolling. Offering that
prisoner the initial access to the court and the opportunity to present
the facts of his case is the only requirement for a petitioner such as
Mendoza to effectively pursue a habeas corpus petition.

186

449 F.3d 1065, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2006).
H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
188
Sessions, supra note 10, at 1514.
189
See, e.g., Perez v. Sherrer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16575 at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 17,
2006); Perez v. Johnson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23727 at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 21,
2001).
190
Federal Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006).
191
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
187
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VI. CONCLUSION
Mendoza v. Carey has provided a new avenue through which other-language defendants might be able to bring their federal habeas
192
corpus claims that were previously time-barred.
Other circuit
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have yet to recognize the
inability to procure legal materials or assistance in one’s own language as an “extraordinary circumstance” that would entitle a prisoner who has exerted due diligence in pursuing his claim to equita193
ble tolling.
Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the
right to access courts, prisons are essentially denying other-language
criminal defendants the capability to bring their claims, and thus equitable tolling is necessary to remedy this violation. Despite Kane’s
denial of a Sixth Amendment right to law library access for a pro se
194
defendant, Lewis still stands as good law on the right of access to
courts and the principle that, based on Equal Protection and Due
195
Process grounds, a state must provide a criminal defendant with the
196
capability to bring his claim to court.
Lewis provides that the state, at the minimum, may not deprive a
197
prisoner of the capability of bringing his claim. It follows that when
a prisoner is actively trying to file a petition of habeas corpus but is
unable to do so because of his inability to procure materials or assistance in his own language at a state facility, a state must confer the
capability through those other materials or assistance for him to
bring his habeas petition to court. While Mendoza does not rely on
Lewis’s right of access to courts, it does recognize that this is an extraordinary circumstance out of the prisoner’s control for the pur198
pose of equitable tolling. Because Lewis requires that a prisoner be
199
able to present his claim, it makes perfect sense that a state that
does not provide access to the necessary assistance by which a nonEnglish-speaking criminal defendant may bring the claim creates exactly the extraordinary circumstance that was envisioned for the pur-
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poses of equitable tolling.
Providing other-language criminal defendants with equitable tolling would then provide them with the ca201
pability to bring their claims in court and thus satisfy Lewis.
In addition to the right of access to courts, the importance of the
202
Great Writ as the “last hope” for criminal defendants to obtain relief from an unconstitutional incarceration calls for equitable tolling
in an extraordinary circumstance such as this. Because an otherlanguage criminal defendant has no chance to know of the AEDPA
unless he has access to legal materials or assistance in his own language to explain it, there is no reason for him to suffer its harsh consequence. If a non-English-speaking defendant loses his claim because he was not able to receive meaningful assistance, principles of
equity require that he be able to bring his claim so long as he pursued it diligently. Once a prisoner is able to know simply of the existence of the AEDPA, perhaps then it would be fair to subject him to
it. But for a prisoner who cannot understand English, let alone the
law itself, we are depriving him of a chance at freedom based solely
on a procedural technicality. The other circuits, along with the Supreme Court, should adopt the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Mendoza v. Carey—that a non-English-speaking criminal defendant should
be entitled to equitable tolling based on his diligence in pursuing his
claim and on the extraordinary circumstance that he was denied ac203
cess to legal materials or assistance in his own language.
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